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I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent article published in this Journal, Professor Jesse
Richardson1 attempted to refute the arguments proposed by myself
and others that support the fairness of downzoning land without
compensation to property owners.2 As Professor Richardson noted,
the issue of downzoning property to preserve farmland has become
a particularly important one in recent years, especially with
increased efforts by local governments to preserve farmland.3
* Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University College of Law.
1. Jesse J. Richardson, Jr. is an assistant professor in the Department of Urban Affairs
and Planning at Virginia Tech in Blacksburg, Virginia, and is an attorney. He received his
B.S. and M.S. in agricultural and applied economics from Virginia Tech and holds a J.D. from
the University of Virginia School of Law.
2. Jesse J. Richardson, Jr., Downzoning, Fairness and Farmland Protection, 19 FLA. ST.
U. J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 59 (2003).
3. Id., at 59-61. Several major studies in recent years have documented the loss of
farmland and concluded that it presents a major societal problem. See, e.g., A. ANN
SORENSEN ET AL., FARMING ON THE EDGE (American Farmland Trust, Northern Illinois
University 1997); NATIONAL AGRICULTURAL LANDS STUDY (U.S. Government Printing Office
1981). This perception is joined by a substantial amount of academic and popular
commentary. See, e.g., TOM DANIELS & DEBORAH BOWERS, HOLDING OUR GROUND:
PROTECTING AMERICA'S FARMS AND FARMLAND (Island Press 1997); Lawrence W. Libby,
Farmland Protection for Illinois: The Planning and Legal Issues, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 425
(1997). A number of other commentators, however, have questioned whether farmland
conversion is in fact a problem, or at least to the degree often stated by proponents of
preservation. See, e.g., Orlando E. Delogu, A Comprehensive State and Local Government
Land Use Control Strategy to Preserve the Nation's Farmland is Unnecessary and Unwise,
34 U. KAN. L. REV. 519 (1986); William A. Fischel, The Urbanization of Urban Land: A
Review of the National Agricultural Lands Study, 58 LAND ECON. 236 (1982).
Whatever the merits of this debate, all levels of government have perceived farmland
conversion as a problem and have responded with a variety of programs to slow and control
the rate of conversion. For instance, the federal government has initiated several actions
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Central to most farmland preservation efforts is agricultural
zoning, which typically involves downzoning farmland to
agricultural use, precluding more intensive development. Although
at times efforts are made to mitigate the economic impact of
agricultural zoning - through purchase of development rights
(PDRs) and transferable development rights (TDRs) - as a
practical matter, both PDRs4 and TDRs' have substantial
restrictions and are of limited value at present. For this reason,
many communities pursue agricultural zoning without providing
compensation to regulated landowners. This means that the cost of
preservation falls on property owners themselves, and often
imposes substantial losses.
As I stated in a previous article, this issue raises two related
concerns. First, does the downzoning of agricultural land
constitute an unconstitutional taking? Second, assuming
downzoning does not constitute an unconstitutional taking, is it
nevertheless unfair to impose substantial economic costs on
landowners absent compensation? As that article suggests, the
fairness concern is an important one, since fairness is an important
component in the political acceptability of farmland preservation.
The answer I provide is that agricultural zoning will rarely
constitute an unconstitutional taking under current Supreme Court
takings jurisprudence.7 This has been borne out by lower court
decisions, which generally find agricultural zoning constitutional,
even when downzoning is involved.8 Moreover, my article gives
directed toward farmland preservation, including passage of the Farmland Protection Policy
Act in 1981, 7 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4209 (2004), and passage of the Federal Agriculture
Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-127, 110 Stat. 888 (1996) (codified as
amended in 7 U.S.C. § 7201). All fifty states have enacted a variety of measures designed to
preserve farmland, including tax incentive programs, right-to-farm laws, agricultural laws,
and Purchase of Development Rights Programs. See generally, William L. Church, Farmland
Conversion: The View from 1986, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 521 (1986); Mark W. Cordes, Takings,
Fairness, and Farmland Preservation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1033, 1045-50 (1999).
4. LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION OF LAND USE § 6:46 (2004); Vivian
Quinn, Preserving Farmland with Conservation Easements: Public Benefit or Burden?, 1992
ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 235 (1992-1993). An increasing number of states also have statutes
specifically authorizing PDR programs. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 6200-6210
(2004).
5. See generally John J. Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay,
83 YALE L.J. 75; Julian Conrad Juergensmeyer et al., Transferable Development Rights and
Alternatives After Suitum, 30 URB. LAw. 441 (1998).
6. Cordes, supra note 3, at 1050.
7. Id. at 1055 (discussing how current Supreme Court takings jurisprudence indicates
"that agricultural zoning w[ill] rarely constitute a taking," even when substantial diminution
in land value occurs).
8. See, e.g., Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1993);
Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991). See generally Cordes, supra
note 3, at 1060-69.
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three reasons why agricultural zoning should not be viewed as
inherently unfair, even when a substantial diminution in value
results: the concept of government giving, which enhances land
value; recognition of general regulatory reciprocity, which mitigates
fairness concerns; and the nature of property rights, which has long
viewed private interests as being subject to broader public needs.9
Professor Richardson mainly disagrees on the issue of fairness,
where he strongly rejects all three of my rationales supporting the
fairness of downzoning farmland. His article is thoughtful and
well-written, helping to identify some limitations of the fairness
arguments that myself and others have used to justify farmland
preservation along with other types of environmental land use
controls. Ultimately, however, I believe that he misses the basic
point of my analysis concerning the fairness of agricultural zoning
as a farmland preservation method, even when landowners are not
compensated for economic loss. The arguments concerning
government giving, reciprocity, and the nature of property rights
are not intended as legal concepts to be incorporated into a judicial
analysis regarding the legality of a particular land use restriction.
Rather, they are offered as general policy rationales that help
explain why the balance drawn by the Supreme Court is a fair one,
a balance that recognizes both individual property rights and
broader community rights. On that basis, I believe my arguments
remain quite valid, and provide a needed perspective on the
fairness of downzoning farmland, even in light of Professor
Richardson's criticisms.
In spite of these dichotomies of thought, Professor Richardson
and I certainly agree on one point: the constitutionality and fairness
of downzoning property to preserve farmland is a very important
issue. By all accounts, the national movement to preserve farmland
remains strong, with numerous communities grappling with issues
of whether and how to preserve farmland.1 ° Downzoning land to
only agricultural use, a common component of many preservation
efforts, has significant consequences for landowners. Moreover, the
basic concerns of the constitutionality and fairness of downzoning
land that results in substantial diminution in value apply to other
types of environmental land use controls, such as those protecting
9. Cordes, supra note 3, at 1072-81.
10. The last several decades have seen growing efforts by state and local governments to
preserve farmland. The growing momentum of the "smart growth" movement, which often
includes farmland preservation as a component of smart growth, will likely increase
farmland preservation efforts. For commentary on the "smart growth" movement, see
Richard Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law, 21 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV.
253 (2002); Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls
of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (2000).
Spring, 2005] 373
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wetlands and coastal zones. Like agricultural zoning, such controls
often result in substantial diminution in value and lack substantial
"specific reciprocity." Thus, examining the constitutionality and
fairness of downzoning farmland is relevant to broader
environmental issues.
The rest of this article will briefly review the takings and
fairness issues noted above. It will not attempt to rehash my initial
analysis or Professor Richardson's critique thereof, which can be
read elsewhere. It will, however, briefly respond to Professor
Richardson's critique and attempt to clarify why downzoning
farmland is not inherently unfair. Part II will briefly reiterate why
downzoning of farmland should usually not be an unconstitutional
taking under the Supreme Court's current takings jurisprudence.
Part III will then try to clarify the government giving, reciprocity,
and property rights analysis. Finally, Part IV will briefly comment
on the role compensatory programs like PDRs and TDRs should
play in effective farmland preservation programs.
II. TAKINGS
The primary legal challenge to downzoning farmland that
results in substantial diminution in value is that it constitutes an
unconstitutional taking. In his article, Professor Richardson also
identifies five other legal challenges to downzoning, including spot
zoning, substantive due process, and equal protection.11 He is
certainly correct that each of these challenges might be a basis to
find downzoning invalid, depending on the particular facts of a case.
As he notes, however, these will typically be unsuccessful, largely
because of the deference given to a local government's land use
authority. Moreover, their potential success typically turns on some
factor other than the economic impact of the restriction, such as the
arbitrary nature of the restriction, or bias against the landowner.
Concerns about the economic impact of a restriction, which have
been much of the focus of the debate about agricultural zoning, are
typically addressed by a takings challenge.
The essence of the Supreme Court's current regulatory takings
analysis is a two-part test drawn from Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council'2 and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City. 3 A court first asks whether the restriction deprives the
landowner of all economically beneficial use of the property. 4 If it
11. Professor Richardson also briefly discusses a "[d]irect [cihallenge of the [a]ct" and
§1983 actions. See Richardson, supra note 2, at 61-5.
12. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
13. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
14. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015-16.
374 [Vol. 20:2
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does, it is a categorical taking, unless the restriction is designed to
prevent a common law nuisance. 15 Second, if some economic
viability remains, a court is to apply what is known as the three-
prong Penn Central test, examining the character of the
government act, the economic impact of the regulation, and the
degree of interference with investment-backed expectations.16
As I have written elsewhere, agricultural zoning restrictions will
rarely constitute a taking under this two-part test. First, the
Supreme Court has indicated that the loss of all economic viability
is an extremely rare occurrence, which is not met as long as some
minimal economic benefit remains. 7 The only case in which the
Court found this to occur was Lucas, in which land, worth nearly
one million dollars based on potential residential development, was
downsized to preclude any development or other economic activity
altogether. In holding that this constituted a categorical taking, the
Court characterized the loss of all economic viability as an
"extraordinary circumstance."" The Court's sole focus in its
discussion in Lucas was on the absence of any beneficial, economic,
or productive uses left by the restriction, in several places
italicizing words to make its point.19 There was no suggestion in
Lucas that severe economic impact itself would constitute a
categorical taking. Indeed, the Court indicated in a footnote that
even a ninety-five percent loss in property value would not be a
categorical taking. It noted, however, that it might constitute a
taking under the Penn Central balancing test.
20
The Court's two most recent decisions involving takings,
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island2 ' and Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council,
15. See id. at 1027-31.
16. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124. This two-part test, in which a court is
to first examine whether there is a categorical taking under Lucas, and if not, apply the Penn
Central analysis, has been affirmed in three recent cases. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330, 342 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
17. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 330; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017-18.
18. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
19. Id. at 1019 (explaining that "[slurely, at least, in the extraordinary circumstance when
no productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted.. .). The Court went on to
state that "there are good reasons for our frequently expressed belief that when the owner
of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses..." Id.
20. Id. at 1019 n.8. In this footnote, the Court responded to an argument in Justice
Stevens' dissenting opinion, in which he criticized the majority opinion as "wholly arbitrary"
because a 'landowner whose property is diminished in value 95% recovers nothing,' while
a landowner who suffers a complete elimination of value "recovers the land's full value."' Id.
at 1064. The majority appeared to agree that a ninety-five percent diminution in value
would not constitute a categorical taking, but was quick to note that a taking might still be
found under the Penn Central test. Id. at 1019 n.8. It further noted that at times a ninety-
five diminution in value would not be a taking under Penn Central. Id.
21. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
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Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,22 affirm the extremely rare
nature of categorical takings based on loss of all economic viability.
In Palazzolo, the regulated landowner had tried to make the case
for a "total taking" by comparing the profit potential for the
property, $3,150,000, with the minimum residual value left after
regulation, $200,000. He argued that in that context, the state
cannot "sidestep" Lucas 'by the simple expedient of leaving a
landowner a few crumbs of value."'23 The Court rejected that
comparison, however, focusing on what was left rather than what
was taken, stating that the property was not "economically idle. 24
The Court in Tahoe-Sierra again took occasion to emphasize the
need for a complete loss of economic use before a categorical taking
could be found. In discussing the reach of a categorical taking under
Lucas, it noted that the statute in Lucas had 'wholly eliminated
the value' 21 of the property, and stressed that Lucas requires a
'complete elimination of value."'26
Under this standard, agricultural zoning would almost never
constitute a categorical taking for the simple reason that farming
is an economically viable activity. This would be true no matter
how great the economic loss in value, since the Court focuses on
what is left, not what is lost.28 As long as the property is suitable to
be farmed, a court would certainly find enough minimal value and
economic viability to meet the first prong of the Lucas/Penn
Central test. The only exception would be where agriculturally
zoned land is truly unsuitable for farming, perhaps based on parcel
size or quality of the soil. In such an instance, there might be a loss
of all economic viability and a taking, which a few courts have
found.29
Even if some economic viability remains, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that a court must also analyze whether a taking has
occurred under the Penn Central test.3" The first Penn Central
22. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
23. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631 (quoting Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 37, Palazzo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (No. 99-2047)).
24. Id. at 631 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019).
25. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 330 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017).
26. Id. (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019-20 n.8).
27. See, e.g., Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands Comm'n, 125 N.J. 193, 213-14 (1991) (noting the
economic viability of agriculture as a land use).
28. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 631.
29. See Petersen v. City of Decorah, 259 N.W.2d 553 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977) (determining
that the land unsuitable for farming and had been unproductive for years); Kmiec v. Town
of Spider Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471 (Wis. 1973) (finding the land unsuitable for farming, and
would cost twice as much to put property into farming condition as the property would be
worth as farmland).
30. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc., 535 U.S. at 342; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533
U.S. 606, 617-18 (2001); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.8.
376 [Vol. 20:2
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factor to be examined is the nature of the government action. This
factor largely distinguishes between physical invasions, which are
per se takings, and mere regulations of property, which have a
strong presumption of constitutionality.31 The second factor, the
economic impact of the regulation, examines the diminution in
value of the restriction. Yet the Penn Central Court emphasized
that diminution in value, no matter how great, is not by itself
enough to constitute a taking.32
The third factor, interference with investment-backed
expectations, is therefore the most significant. At first, this factor
might appear to support the argument that downzoning of farmland
is an unconstitutional taking, since it can be argued that by its very
nature downzoning changes previous development rights, and thus
interferes with landowner expectations based on those rights. But,
the Penn Central case itself indicates that expectations are not as
concerned with previous zoning status as with the original intent
when property was acquired. To illustrate, Penn Central used the
property in question for sixty-five years as a railroad terminal, but
lost extremely valuable air development rights when the property
was designated as a landmark under New York City's Landmark
Preservation Law.33 In concluding that the landmark restriction
was not a taking, the Supreme Court stressed that the Landmark
Preservation Law did "not interfere with what must be regarded as
Penn Central's primary expectation concerning the use of the
parcel."34 Thus, even though the Landmark Preservation Law
eliminated more intensive development that was previously
permitted by its zoning, the assurance of some economic viability
and continuation of previous uses that formed earlier expectations
negated any takings concerns.
31. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (stating that
"[slo, too, is the character of the governmental action. A 'taking' may more readily be found
when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government, (internal citation omitted), than when interference arises from some public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.").
32. See id. at 131. As an example that substantial diminution in value is not enough by
itself to constitute a taking, the Penn Central Court cited the seventy-five percent diminution
in value in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., in which the Supreme Court nevertheless
sustained the validity of the challenged zoning restrictions. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Although
Euclid is not generally considered a takings case, the Court's discussion of it in Penn Central
suggests that broadly applied land use restrictions can impose substantial economic loss and
still not constitute a taking. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 125-35. Lower courts have
similarly stated that mere diminution in value is not enough, by itself, to constitute a taking.
See, e.g., Messer v. Town of Chapel Hill, 485 S.E.2d 269, 270 (1997); Gardner, 125 N.J. at
212.
33. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 115-18.
34. Id. at 136.
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This analysis suggests that despite the substantial diminution
in value that downzoning farmland often creates, it is unlikely to
substantially interfere with investment-based expectations so as to
constitute a taking. Almost all farmland subject to farmland
preservation restrictions was originally acquired for agricultural
use. As in Penn Central, the original investment reflects the
permitted agricultural use; the downzoning only interferes with
opportunities subsequent to investment. Although downzoning in
such a situation clearly has an economic impact on the affected
landowner, it does not interfere with investment-backed
expectations as contemplated in Penn Central. Indeed, Penn Central
itself essentially involved this same scenario, where previously
permitted development opportunities were eliminated, resulting in
significant economic impact, but it was held that the opportunities
did not interfere with the original expectation of the property
owner. 35
Lower court decisions have consistently shown that establishing
a taking under the Penn Central test is extremely hard, a point
which Professor Richardson concedes.36 As a general matter, courts
have consistently upheld restrictions on environmentally sensitive
land, even when diminutions exceeded fifty percent of the land
value.37 Indeed, a recent Court of Claims decision, Walcek v. United
States,38 reviewed a number of Supreme Court, Federal Circuit, and
Court of Claims cases and stated that diminution in value needed
to be "well in excess of 85 percent" for a taking to be found under
Penn Central.39
Lower courts have also consistently found agricultural zoning
restrictions constitutional, even when substantial diminution in
35. See id. The Court has explicitly or implicitly considered the issue of interference with
investment-backed expectations with regard to land use restrictions in several cases since
Penn Central, without ever finding a taking on that basis. See Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 493-94 (1987); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255,
262-63 (1980).
36. Richardson, supra note 2, at 68-69 (stating that "a downzoning would rarely amount
to a taking of private property for public purposes under the Penn Central balancing test.").
37. See, e.g., Nasser v. City of Homewood, 671 F.2d 432, 435, 438 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (finding
a fifty-three percent diminution in value not a taking); Pace Res., Inc. v. Shrewsbury
Township, 808 F.2d 1023, 1031 (3d Cir. 1987) (finding an eighty-seven percent diminution
in value not a taking); Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Borough of Bernardsville, 608 A.2d 1377,
1386-90 (N.J. 1992) (finding a ninety percent diminution in value not a taking).
38. 49 Fed. Cl. 248 (2001).
39. Id. at 271-72. In Walcek, the Court of Claims held that a 59.7 percent diminution in
value was not a taking. Id. at 271. In its analysis, it noted that the Supreme Court several
times has suggested "that diminutions in value approaching 85 to 90 percent do not
necessarily" constitute a taking. Id. (citing Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365, 384 (1926) (holding a zoning ordinance valid despite a seventy-five percent diminution
in value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 395 (1915) (finding no taking despite an 87.5
percent diminution in value).
[Vol. 20:2378
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value occurs. Although these cases often blend state and federal
laws together, they have generally approached takings claims
consistently with the above Supreme Court standards, rejecting
takings claims in the vast majority of cases.4" In doing so, they have
often noted that agricultural zoning permits economically viable use
of property as long as it is suitable for farming. On occasion, courts
have invalidated agricultural zoning restrictions, but this typically
occurred in three situations: the land was unsuitable for farming,
a unique state standard was applied, or the agricultural zoning
restriction was arbitrary.4
None of this discussion is meant to suggest that downzoning
farmland is never an unconstitutional taking. Takings analysis is
necessarily fact sensitive, and at times, downzoning is
unconstitutional. Moreover, as Professor Richardson discussed,
downzoning farmland might violate other legal standards.
However, if done pursuant to good planning, agricultural zoning
should rarely constitute a taking under the current Supreme Court
takings analysis. This is true even if downzoning results in
substantial diminution of land values, which means that local
governments can pursue farmland preservation by putting the cost
of regulation on affected landowners. The next section of this article
will examine Professor Richardson's critique of the arguments made
by myself and others advocating that placing the cost of
preservation on affected landowners is not inherently unfair.
III. FAIRNESS
In addition to stating that agricultural zoning is rarely a taking,
my previous writings have also argued that agricultural zoning is
not inherently unfair, even when resulting in substantial
diminution in property value. The takings and fairness issues
40. See, e.g., Christensen v. Yolo County Bd. of Supervisors, 995 F.2d 161 (9th Cir. 1993);
Barancik v. County of Marin, 872 F.2d 834 (9th Cir. 1988); Habersham at Northridge v.
Fulton County, Ga., 632 F. Supp. 815 (N.D. Ga. 1985); Gilliland v. City of Palmdale, 179 Cal.
Rptr. 627 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); County of Ada v. Henry, 668 P.2d 994 (Idaho 1983); Wilson
v. County of McHenry, 416 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Vanderburgh County Bd. of
Comm'rs v. Rittenhouse, 575 N.E.2d 663 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); Bell River Assocs. v. Charter
Township of China, 565 N.W.2d 695 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997); Gardner v. N.J. Pinelands
Comm'n, 593 A.2d 251 (N.J. 1991); Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979);
Smythe v. Butler Township, 620 N.E.2d 901 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993); Murray v. Columbia River
Gorge Comm'n, 865 P.2d 1319 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
41. See Petersen v. City of Decorah, 259 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa Ct. App. 1977); Kmiec v.
Town of Spider Lake, 211 N.W.2d 471, 476-77 (Wis. 1973).
42. See Cordes, supra note 3, at 1072-81. See also Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the
Constitution: The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 229-38 (1997)
[hereinafter Leapfrogging] (arguing that environmental regulations that impose significant
losses on landowners are not so inherently unfair so as to require compensation).
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somewhat overlap, since the Supreme Court has often stated that
fairness concerns are central to takings jurisprudence. 3 Yet there
is little doubt that many people, especially affected landowners,
often perceive that restrictions on farmland, though not a taking,
are still unfair when there is a substantial economic impact. In that
context, I have made several arguments as to why agricultural
zoning should not be viewed as inherently unfair simply because
there is a substantial drop in property values. It is on this issue
that Professor Richardson is particularly critical of the arguments
advanced by myself and others.
In making these arguments, I have been careful to state that I
was not arguing that agricultural zoning is never unfair. To the
contrary, I have stated that agricultural zoning, like any other land
use control, might at times be unfair as applied to a particular
parcel of land.4 Similarly, I have supported modified use of PDR
and TDR programs to provide some compensation to landowners to
more evenly distribute the regulatory burden between affected
landowners and society as a whole.45 Indeed, in a perfect world, I
would make generous use of both PDRs and TDRs to help mitigate
the sometimes harsh effects of downzoning farmland. These would
not only shift some of the cost of preservation to the public, but in
the long run, might prove to be more effective preservation methods
than agricultural zoning by itself. 6
But, we do not live in a perfect world, and PDRs and TDRs both
are of limited utility because of the cost of PDRs47 and the necessity
43. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (stating that takings clause
"was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."); Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,618 (2001) (quotingArmstrong); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 384 (1994) (quoting Armstrong); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
123-24 (1997) (quoting Armstrong).
44. See Cordes, supra note 3, at 1072.
45. Id. at 1082-83. See also Mark W. Cordes, Agricultural Zoning: Impacts and Future
Directions, 22 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 419, 453-55 (2002) [hereinafter Agricultural Zoning] (stating
that effective farmland preservation programs should incorporate some use of PDRs and
TDRs with agricultural zoning).
46. The conventional wisdom is that zoning by itself is often not a particularly effective
farmland preservation method in the long run, primarily because of the inherent
impermanence of any system based on political choice. In particular, commentators have
noted that the opportunity to change zoning restrictions through variances and rezonings
undermines agricultural zonings effectiveness as a long-term answer to the problem of
farmland conversion. See, e.g., Jeanne S. White, Beating Plowshares into Townhomes: The
Loss of Farmland and Strategies for Slowing its Conversion to Nonagricultural Uses, 28
ENVTL. L. 113, 118-19 (1998); Sean F. Nolon & Cozata Solloway, Preserving Our Heritage:
Tools to Cultivate Agricultural Preservation in New York State, 17 PACE L. REV. 591, 628
(1997). Pressure for zoning change should be substantially lessened when landowners are
compensated to some degree by PDRs or TDRs and development rights are more explicitly
transferred to local government.
47. The fiscal restraints of PDR programs have been noted by numerous commentators.
[Vol. 20:2380
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of certain conditions to make TDRs work.48 Thus, although PDRs
and TDRs both have a role to play in a comprehensive farmland
system, most efforts at farmland preservation must rely heavily on
agricultural zoning, without compensation, to succeed.
Consequently, I have argued that use of uncompensated
agricultural zoning is not inherently unfair, despite the substantial
economic losses it sometimes imposes on landowners.
My basic argument that agricultural zoning is not inherently
unfair is three-fold. First, any perceived unfairness based on
decreased property value presumes that the entire value of land
was based on the landowner's efforts; to the contrary, a substantial
portion of private property value is often created by government
"givings." Second, any concept of fairness must not only consider
how burdens and benefits are distributed within a single
government action, but must also focus on the reciprocal nature of
burdens and benefits within society more broadly, a concept I label
"general reciprocity." Third, the argument that agricultural zoning
is unfair emphasizes the private development perspective of
property rights, neglecting the social dimension of property rights
long integral in our legal system.
Before examining each of these arguments and Professor
Richardson's critique, it should be emphasized that these
arguments are offered as general policy arguments as to why
uncompensated agricultural zoning is not inherently unfair. Viewed
another way, they are three rationales why the balance drawn by
the Supreme Court's current takings jurisprudence, in which
downzoning that results in substantial diminution in value is rarely
a taking, is fair. However, none of the three rationales are intended
to be incorporated in any takings analysis as such, a point that I
think is very clear from the structure of my previous writings.49
See, e.g., MALONE, supra note 4, § 6:46; SARAH E. REDFIELD, VANISHING FARMLAND: A LEGAL
SOLUTION FOR THE STATES 99-100 (D.C. Heath and Company 1984); William L. Church,
Farmland Conversion: The View from 1986, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 521, 545-46 (1986).
48. To succeed, TDR programs require the right mix of market conditions, including
appropriate "receiving areas" that are restrictive enough to make the TDRs valuable and
which can easily absorb increased development. They also require stability of zoning
restrictions so that the value of the TDRs are not undermined. See Jerold S. Kayden, Market-
Based Regulatory Approaches: A Comparative Discussion of Environmental and Land Use
Techniques in the United States, 19 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 565, 578 (1991-1992). The
frequency with which zoning change requests are granted often makes this difficult to
achieve.
49. In my primary article on farmland preservation, Takings, Fairness, and Farmland
Preservation, I discuss takings issues and fairness issues in two completely different sections
of the article. Cordes, supra note 3. Moreover, nowhere do I suggest that the arguments
regarding givings, general reciprocity, and property rights should be incorporated into a
takings analysis. Rather, I offer the arguments to show why the line drawn by the Supreme
Court's takings jurisprudence, in which restrictions imposing substantial economic costs on
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Moreover, the three arguments are not intended to be primarily
applied on a case-by-case basis to determine the fairness of a
particular land use restriction. Rather, they are offered as general
considerations on why substantial diminution in value from
agricultural zoning is not inherently unfair.
A. Givings
The idea of focusing on government "givings," and not just
takings, has become a popular one in recent years.5" Government
"givings" are those actions by government entities which increase
land values. As noted by others, much of the value of farmland is
the result of government givings, which enhance the value of land.5
For example, the very act of zoning regulation itself adds significant
value to land. Specifically, the increased value of agricultural land
in alternative, residential use exists in part because government
zoning would protect any residential development from conflicting
industrial and commercial uses. Any arguments based on loss of
property value necessarily reflect property values largely enhanced
by protective government regulatory schemes.
As I previously discussed, the most obvious example of
government givings in regard to farmland subject to development
pressure is basic infrastructure support that makes land
developable in the first place. This is particularly relevant with
regard to farmland preservation issues, where high land values
reflect conversion pressure, which in turn reflects various
government actions. Specifically, highway and road development
greatly enhance land values by increasing accessibility to property
for residential use. These programs are primarily paid for by
general tax revenues; however, they often result in disproportionate
financial benefit to undeveloped land, often farmland, in proximity
to development."
landowners are usually not takings, is not inherently unfair.
50. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: Funding Public Acquisition of Private
Property Interests on the Coasts, 27 HARv. ENvTL. L. REV. 295 (2003); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547 (2001); Cordes, supra note 3, at 1072-75; C. Ford
Runge, The Congressional Budget Office's Regulatory Takings and Proposals for Change:
One-sided and Uninformed, 7 ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 5 (1999); Donald L. Elliot, Givings and
Takings, 48 LAND USE L. AND ZONING DIG. 1, 3 (1996); Edward Thompson, Jr., The
Government Giveth, 11 ENvTL. FORUM 2, 22 (March/April 1994).
51. See, e.g., Elliot, supra note 50, at 3; Thompson, supra note 50, at 22.
52. It is important to recognize that in recent years developers have been increasingly
required to pay for some infrastructure costs through exaction requirements, typically in the
form of land dedications and impact fees. See generally ALAN A. ALTSHULER & JOSE A.
GOMEZ-IBANEz, REGULATION FOR REVENUE 19-20, 35-39 (The Brookings Institution 1994). It
might therefore be argued that through the practice of exactions, landowners themselves pay
for the enhanced value of the land. This is subject to several limitations. First, land values
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A variant of a simple example I have used elsewhere illustrates
the potential impact of government givings on land values.53
Assume a tract of farmland, somewhat remote and removed from
major development, has a value of $50,000. The government then
puts in a major highway near the property, making it far more
accessible to several suburban areas. Over the course of several
years, development begins to occur, more roads are put in, and the
value of the farmland increases to $300,000. The local government
then restricts the property to agricultural use, decreasing its value
to $100,000. Although it might initially appear that government
action diminished the property value by two-thirds, in fact the
cumulative effect was to double its value.
Real life examples are not nearly this clear cut, but the example
illustrates the basic point: government action often accounts for a
substantial part of land value. In turn, agricultural and other land
use regulations, which at first glance appear to be unfairly taking
substantial economic value from landowners, in fact might be
taking back values the government itself created. This is not meant
to ignore or minimize the considerable role private enterprise often
plays in enhancing land values. Further, it should not foreclose use
of compensatory schemes, such as PDRs and TDRs, in preserving
farmland. However, it does suggest that true land value loss is
often not nearly as great as it might at first appear.
Professor Richardson had three criticisms of using government
givings to help establish the fairness of downzoning. First, he said
that it proves too much, since all landowners, not just owners of
undeveloped farmland, benefited from government givings." As he
noted, the value of residential property and businesses in proximity
to farmland also reflects givings by government acts. Recognizing
that all property benefits from government givings raised two
"equity issues." First, it is inequitable to recover givings from some
landowners and not others. Second, recovering givings from
are often substantially enhanced by government activities not typically financed by
exactions, such as major highways. Second, exactions are designed to help pay for new
infrastructure necessitated by development, whereas the givings argument focuses on the
enhanced value of undeveloped land created by government infrastructure prior to any
development. Third, the amount of exactions can only correspond to the burden imposed by
new developments, not to enhanced land values. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374,
391 (1994) (requiring "rough proportionality" between exaction and development impact).
As a practical matter, the enhanced value of property through exactions imposed by
government in its coordinating function far exceeds the cost of the exaction.
53. See Mark W. Cordes, The Public/Private Balance in Land Use Regulation, 1998
DETROIT C.L.. REV. 681, 698 (1998) [hereinafter Land Use Regulation]; Leapfrogging, supra
note 42, at 235-36.
54. Richardson, supra note 2, at 76-78.
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farmland owners creates an additional giving to nearby property
owners.
55
I certainly agree with Professor Richardson that all property
values reflect government givings, but that is hardly fatal to the
givings argument. First, when government entities preserve
farmland, they are not intentionally seeking to recapture their
givings from a few landowners. Rather, they are imposing controls
to protect broader public interests, often resulting in loss of
economic value to affected landowners. The givings argument is
simply an explanation of why the resulting economic loss is not as
unfair as it might at first appear. Other owners of undeveloped land
might also be, and frequently are, subject to downzoning for the
public good, and in such instances, recognition of government
"givings" might also help explain why the loss in value is not as
unfair as it might first appear. The givings analysis is by no means
unique to farmland preservation, and indeed, to the extent
necessary, it might be applied to downzoning other types of
undeveloped land for the public good.
Second, although all land value reflects government givings, all
land does not benefit to the same degree. The givings argument
regarding farmland preservation is predicated on the fact that
undeveloped land on the suburban fringe often receives
disproportionate givings, which greatly increases the property
value.
Finally, and this is very important, the discussion regarding
givings and fairness is in the context of restrictions on undeveloped
land, such as farmland. The law has long drawn a distinction
between development expenditures on property, which is largely
protected absent nuisance activity, and investment in undeveloped
land, which is not protected. There are very strong policy reasons
to protect actual development expenditures in land, which the law
currently protects through the takings and vested rights doctrines.
Thus, Professor Richardson's implicit suggestion that the givings
analysis might be used as an excuse to place new restrictions on
already developed property, such as homes, businesses, and
industrial uses, is quite misleading.5"
55. Id.
56. Land use law has long provided substantial protection of actual development of land
through its vested rights doctrine. See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW §§
6.12-6.23 (5th ed. 2003). This body of law says that at a certain point in the development
process, usually including issuance of a building permit together with some reasonable
development expenditures, a landowner establishes vested rights in current permitted uses
which cannot be subsequently restricted by government regulations. Although what is
necessary to establish vested rights varies considerably from state to state, in no state is the
mere purchase price of undeveloped land, even when reflecting then permitted land uses,
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Professor Richardson's second argument against the givings
analysis is that it proves too much, because if pushed to an extreme,
it would justify elimination of all property rights. This is because
land has no value absent "government regulations to specify and
enforce property rights."57 Richardson states:
If the logic of the givings argument holds, the
government may therefore confiscate all property
without compensation. The givings argument asserts
that what the government giveth, it may take away.
Such a rule results in nonexistent property rights
and valueless property. No government action
constitutes a taking under this regime.5"
Richardson is right that, if pushed to an extreme, the givings
analysis might negate the takings analysis. However, no one is
making that argument or anything like it. Current takings law
reflects a balance between the protection of private property rights
on the one hand, and recognition of broader community rights on
the other, a balance which I strongly support. As noted earlier, the
balance falls heavily in favor of private property rights once actual
development expenditures are made on land.59 Conversely, takings
law leans heavily in favor of broader public interests regarding
undeveloped land.6° I have written elsewhere on why this balance
makes sense and recognized the important role protection of private
property plays in society.6 The "givings" argument is simply one
component as to why drawing a balance in favor of the public
sufficient to establish vested rights.
In addition to the vested rights doctrine, the Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence
would appear to apply with particular force when government interferes with established,
rather than just potential, uses. Indeed, an argument can be made that this is the clearest
example of the type of interference with investment-based expectations that would constitute
a taking under Penn Central. The Penn Central Court, in finding no taking, emphasized
there was no interference with the original use of the terminal, strongly suggesting that
interference with established uses would be a different matter, absent a clear nuisance-like
activity. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 (1978).
57. Richardson, supra note 2, at 78.
58. Id. at 79.
59. See supra note 56.
60. Commentators have often recognized this sharp distinction between restrictions on
established uses, which are granted substantial protection, and restrictions on potential uses,
which are often subject to substantial limitations in order to serve the broader public
interest. See, e.g., Eric T. Freyfogle, The Owning and Taking of Sensitive Lands, 43 UCLA
L. REV. 77, 134 (1995-1996) (explaining that "[i]n the law of takings, a considerable difference
exists between a regulation that interferes with a current land use and one that bans a
prospective land use").
61. See Mark W. Cordes, Property Rights and Land Use Controls; Balancing Private and
Public Interest, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 629 (1998-1999); Land Use Regulation, supra note 53.
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interest with regard to preserving farmland might not be as unfair
as the drop in land value might initially suggest.
Professor Richardson's third argument against the givings
analysis is that "the law simply fails to condone the givings
argument," stating that the Federal Constitution, state
constitutions, and eighty years of legal analysis lack reference to
the idea of givings.62 But again, Richardson misses the point. At
least as presented in my writings, the givings argument is not
intended to be incorporated into the takings analysis, but instead
is simply an observation on why restrictions that result in
substantial drop in property value, which are rarely takings, are
also not inherently unfair. The fact that the Supreme Court has
failed to discuss givings is irrelevant. Professor Richardson seems
to suggest that unless the Supreme Court has given its imprimatur
to an idea, it lacks validity. That makes little sense, especially when
the idea is not intended to be directly incorporated into the takings
analysis.
It is also somewhat ironic that Professor Richardson states that
"[t]he reasoning behind the givings doctrine ignores the takings
clause of the U.S. Constitution and over eighty years of legal case
law."63 The givings argument, as developed by myself and others,
is in part intended to defend the basic fairness of the Court's
current takings doctrine, which clearly permits restrictions on
undeveloped land which result in substantial diminution in value.
Givings proponents are quite cognizant of the Supreme Court's
takings jurisprudence, including the substantial ability it gives local
governments to preserve farmland without paying compensation.64
It is Professor Richardson who appears to be quite bothered by the
implications of the Court's current takings jurisprudence, with
Richardson implicitly suggesting that downsizing without
compensation is inappropriate.
Finally, Professor Richardson made the statement that
"[n]owhere does the U.S. Constitution, nor any state constitution,
prohibit givings."6 That, of course, is true, but if he was suggesting
that I am opposed to givings, nothing could be further from the
truth. I strongly support government actions, such as provision of
infrastructure, which enhance land values. Further, I do not believe
that government entities should try to recapture those givings. My
only point is that when the government pursues other actions for
the good of society, such as environmental regulations or farmland
62. Richardson, supra note 2, at 79.
63. Id.
64. See supra notes 12-39 and accompanying text..
65. Richardson, supra note 2, at 79.
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preservation, that decrease property values, people should be aware
that much of the lost value often reflects government givings. As
such, the perceived unfairness of the restriction is not as great as
the drop in land value might suggest.
Givings arguments are not perfect, and they are subject to
limitations, as Professor Richardson partially demonstrates. But
their imperfection hardly means they are invalid. Taken for what
they are, arguments showing that some of the decreased value
resulting from downzoning farmland reflects value created by
government givings, helps mitigate the perceived harshness and
unfairness of downzoning. Although not drawn from judicial
analysis, givings arguments are certainly consistent with and
supportive of the basic balance drawn by the Supreme Court and
lower courts in takings cases. Additionally, the givings argument
does not pose the Hobbesean threat of potentially eliminating all
property rights, as suggested by Professor Richardson. Takings
jurisprudence has drawn a clear line to prevent elimination of
property rights, and the givings analysis simply is one component
in understanding why the line the Supreme Court has drawn is a
sensible one.
B. General Reciprocity
Related to the idea of government givings is reciprocity, which
is the idea that government regulations often bestow both reciprocal
burdens and benefits to property owners. I have suggested that the
concept of reciprocity can be viewed from two perspectives, "specific
reciprocity" and "general reciprocity."6 Specific reciprocity refers
only to benefits and burdens flowing from the same regulation. This
appears to be what the Supreme Court typically means when it
refers to an "average reciprocity of advantage."67 In the case of
zoning, for example, individual landowners are burdened by
restrictions placed on their land, but receive some benefits from
neighboring property having similar burdens. Although benefits
and burdens are not always evenly distributed, and burdens might
66. Cordes, supra note 3, at 1075-77; Leapfrogging, supra note 42, at 236-37.
67. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017-18 (1992); Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922). For general discussions of the Supreme Court's treatment of reciprocity
of advantage, see Andrew W. Schwartz, Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the
Antidemocratic Trend in Regulatory Takings, 22 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2003-2004);
Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of the "Harm/Benefit" and 'Average Reciprocity of Advantage"
Rules in Comprehensive Takings Analysis, 50 VAND. L. REV. 1449 (1997); Raymond R.
Coletta, Reciprocity of Advantage and Regulatory Takings: Toward a New Theory of Takings
Jurisprudence, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 297 (1990).
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outweigh benefits, reciprocal benefits might at least partially offset
the burdens imposed by a particular regulation.
I have also argued that reciprocity can be viewed from a broader
perspective. Under this perspective, the reciprocal burdens and
benefits of regulatory life are generally considered, as opposed to
only those flowing from a specific regulation. Thus, although a
particular regulation might decrease the value of an owner's
property, that same owner might benefit from numerous other
regulations that restrict other parties."8 For example, an owner
whose property is subject to particular land use restrictions might
benefit from Clean Water Act restrictions over one neighbor,
wetland controls over a second, and flood plain restrictions over a
third. On a much broader level, various economic and social
regulations may benefit the person economically.
As I state elsewhere, any serious argument about fairness must
recognize the significant regulatory benefits that flow to landowners
as a result of other regulations. Focusing only on the burden caused
by a particular regulation distorts the regulatory equation, making
the government accountable for burdens imposed, but not giving the
government credit for the benefits created. For all practical
purposes, it makes almost all government regulatory efforts
vulnerable to charges of unfairness, because when viewed in
isolation, most regulations will burden some parties more than
others. 9 Viewing benefits and burdens from a broader perspective
helps to mitigate perceptions of unfairness.
Professor Richardson was particularly critical of the concept of
general reciprocity, stating that it lacks any basis in the law and
that it would prove unworkable in practice."0 Again, he misses the
basic point. The idea of general reciprocity is not intended to be
included in the takings analysis as such. Rather, it helps explain
why downzoning property is not necessarily unfair and why
regulations should not only be considered in isolation, but also
viewed in a broader regulatory context.
Professor Richardson was partially correct when he stated that
the idea of general reciprocity "is on shaky ground, at best, 71 at
least in terms of specific endorsement by the Supreme Court.
Although the Supreme Court's use of reciprocity is a very loose one,
requiring no quantification of actual benefits and making it clear
68. See Cordes, supra note 3, at 1075-77; Leapfrogging, supra note 42, at 236-37.
69. Cordes, supra note 3, at 1076-77; Leapfrogging, supra note 42, at 237. See also,
Lawrence W. Libby, Property Rights - The Public - Private Balance?, MSU LAND USE
FORUM CONF., Jan. 9-10, 1996, at 93, 98 (noting that our tendency is to accept the benefits
of a regulation as a given, but complain about the burdens as an infringement of rights).
70. Richardson, supra note 2, at 82-85.
71. Id. at 83.
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that benefits need not equal burdens,72 it nevertheless has been in
the context of discussing benefits and burdens from the same
regulation. But, as I continually note, I have never intended the
concept of general reciprocity to be incorporated into the takings
analysis. Rather, it is offered as a rationale as to why negative
impacts from a particular regulation are not inherently unfair,
since from a broader perspective, losers from one regulation might
be winners in another.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court has not articulated the
concept of general reciprocity as such, it has at times stated that
most regulatory burdens must be borne "as concomitants of the
advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community." 3
In stating this principle, the Court made no effort to identify
reciprocal benefits from the challenged regulation, but instead put
regulatory burdens in a broader context. This is reciprocity stated
at the most general level possible, but the point is quite valid. There
are enormous advantages and benefits gained from doing business
in America's regulatory framework, and the burdens imposed by
any particular regulation must be evaluated in that context. This
applies to land development as well as other business activity.
The importance of viewing reciprocity from a broader
perspective was also emphasized in a recent California Supreme
Court decision, San Remo Hotel v. City of San Francisco,74 where
the court essentially endorsed the idea of general reciprocity. San
72. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). The
Court, in a footnote, stated:
The Takings Clause has never been read to require the States or the
courts to calculate whether a specific individual has suffered burdens
under this generic rule in excess of the benefits received. Not every
individual gets a full dollar return in benefits for the taxes he or she
pays; yet, no one suggests that an individual has a right to compensation
for the difference between taxes paid and the dollar value of benefits
received.
Id. at 492 n.21.
73. This idea was first articulated by Justice Brandeis in a dissent in Pennsylvania Coal
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 422 (1922), where he identified a number of previous cases
where a taking was not found despite the absence of any reciprocal advantage from the
regulation, "unless it be the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community."
In more recent cases the Supreme Court has referred to this concept to indicate that most
regulatory burdens must be viewed in light of "the advantages of doing business in a civilized
society." See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1007 (1984) (stating that "such
restrictions are the burdens we all must bear in exchange for 'the advantage of living and
doing business in a civilized community") (internal citation omitted); Kirby Forest Indus. v.
United States, 467 U.S. 1, 14 (1984) (explaining that "most burdens consequent upon
government action undertaken in the public interest must be borne by individual landowners
as concomitants of 'the advantage of living and doing business in a civilized community")
(quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 67 (1979)).
74. 27 Cal. 4th 643 (2002).
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Remo Hotel involved a challenge to an ordinance requiring payment
of an impact fee when residential hotels converted to tourist hotels.
The fee was designed to help replace lost housing. The court held
the ordinance constitutional, finding that imposition of the impact
fee was a reasonable response to problems posed by hotel
conversion. 5 The court rejected the argument that the ordinance
lacked reciprocity of advantage, stating that:
[T]he necessary reciprocity of advantage lies not in a
precise balance of burdens and benefits accruing to
property from a single law, or in an exact equality of
burdens among all property owners, but in the
interlocking system of benefits, economic and
noneconomic, that all the participants in a
democratic society may expect to receive, each also
being called upon from time to time to sacrifice some
advantage, economic or noneconomic, for the common
good. 76
It is also noteworthy that Professor Frank Michelman's highly
influential article on takings, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of Just Compensation Law,77
also endorsed the idea of general reciprocity, although he did not
call it by that name. Not only has this article greatly influenced the
takings theory, but scholars have often noted that the article
appeared to greatly influence the Supreme Court's thinking in Penn
Central.78 In that portion of the article primarily focusing on
fairness as an underlying concern in takings jurisprudence,
Professor Michelman noted that land use regulations will often
diminish property values without compensation, which might
appear unfair. He believes that this problem is addressed by
considering the regulations from a broader perspective, stating:
75. See id. at 672-73.
76. Id. at 675-76.
77. 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
78. See, e.g, JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 1165 (4th ed. 1998) (stating
that '"the distinct investment-backed expectations' formulation is obviously drawn from
Professor Michelman's influential essay on takings") (citation omitted); R.S. Radford & J.
David Breemer, Great Expectations: Will Palazzolo v. Rhode Island Clarify the Murky
Doctrine of Investment-Backed Expectations in Regulatory Takings Law?, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 449, 449-55 (2001) (discussing how the factor described as "the degree to which a
regulation interferes with 'distinct investment-backed expectations"' in Penn Central
originated in the Michelman article).
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Efficiency-motivated collective measures will
regularly inflict on countless people disproportionate
burdens which cannot practically be erased by
compensation settlements. In the face of this
difficulty, it seems that we are pleased to believe that
we can arrive at an acceptable level of assurance that
over time the burdens associated with collectively
determined improvements will have been distributed
"evenly" enough so that everyone will be a net
gainer.79
Whether one agrees with Michelman that over time everyone will
be a net gainer from regulatory life in general, it is quite reasonable
to believe that the harsh economic impacts from one regulation will
often be offset by economic benefits from other regulations.
Finally, I would like to respond briefly to Professor Richardson's
discussion of specific reciprocity. As he noted, this is what the
Supreme Court is referring to when it mentions average reciprocity
of advantage from time to time in its cases. Professor Richardson
endorsed the need to account for such specific benefits when
engaging in a takings analysis, stating that "the less specific
reciprocity the regulation contains, the more likely the court will
strike the regulation down." 80 This suggests that it is a significant
factor in the takings analysis.
The Supreme Court has certainly mentioned "reciprocity of
advantage" on a number of occasions, and at times suggested it was
an important consideration. For example, in the early case of
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,"' the Court struck down a statute
prohibiting the mining of anthracite coal when subsidence damage
would result. The Court held the statute an unconstitutional
taking, focusing primarily on the statute's severe economic impact
on the property interests of coal companies.8 2 In doing so, however,
it distinguished this case from an earlier one upholding a coal
regulation. The Court stated that in the earlier case, the regulation
was "secured [on] an average reciprocity of advantage" that the
Pennsylvania statue in this case did not possess. 3 More recently,
in Agins v. City of Tiburon,4 the Court upheld a low density
79. Michelman, supra note 77, at 1225.
80. Richardson, supra note 2, at 83.
81. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
82. See id. at 413-15.
83. Id. at 415. The earlier case was Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531
(1914), where the Court said a law requiring coal companies to leave pillars of coal on the
boundaries of adjacent property was constitutional.
84. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
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residential restriction on land, in part because other properties had
similar restrictions, providing some reciprocity of advantage."
Thus, on occasion, the Court has appeared to give some weight to
the presence or absence of specific reciprocity in its analysis.
Upon closer examination, however, in recent years the Court
has generally not stressed the absence of substantial specific
reciprocity in its analysis, or at least has been very generous in
finding specific reciprocity. The most obvious example is Penn
Central itself, where the Landmark Preservation Law restricted
only isolated properties throughout the city, imposing substantial
burdens on them that were not shared by neighboring properties.
For all practical purposes, there was very little, if any, true
reciprocity from the ordinance in question, a point strongly
emphasized both by Penn Central Company and Justices Rehnquist
and Stevens in dissent.86 The majority, however, took a much more
generous view of reciprocity, stating that Penn Central benefited
from the other landmarks in the community.87 This was somewhat
of a stretch. Since Penn Central was one of only a very few
properties affected, it would gain very little benefit compared to the
substantial burdens imposed. Even more remarkable, the Court
appeared to suggest that since the Landmark Preservation Law was
designed to benefit all the citizens and structures of New York,
Penn Central received some benefit from the law, which was all
that was required.8"
As Professor Richardson noted, I have acknowledged that
agricultural zoning does not provide substantial specific reciprocity
because most of the perceived benefits of farmland preservation,
including food security and environmental amenities, go to the
public more generally.89 This is not to say that there are not some
benefits to landowners flowing from the restrictions themselves.
First, as members of society, landowners receive the above
mentioned benefits like everyone else, and arguably to a somewhat
85. See id. at 262.
86. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 147-49 (1977) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting).
87. See id. at 134.
88. The Court stated that:
Unless we are to reject the judgment of the New York City Council that
the preservation of landmarks benefits all New York citizens and all
structures, both economically and by improving the quality of life in the
city as a whole - which we are unwilling to do - we cannot conclude
that the owners of the Terminal have in no sense been benefited by the
Landmarks Law.
Id. at 134-35.
89. Cordes, supra note 3, at 1076.
392 [Vol. 20:2
FARMLAND PRESERVATION
greater degree than others. ° More importantly, however, if
restrictions are imposed as part of a comprehensive program, as
they should be, then restricted landowners receive the benefits of
agricultural zoning on surrounding property. Specifically, this
insulates farms from the problems of conflicting residential use,
including traffic problems, stormwater runoff damage to crops, and
potential nuisance suits.9' These types of reciprocal benefits are
every bit as substantial, and probably more so, than the burdens
the property owners received in Penn Central. Thus, although most
of the benefits of agricultural zoning go to society in general and not
to regulated landowners, there is certainly enough specific
reciprocity from agricultural zoning to meet the rather loose
standards that the Supreme Court has established for reciprocity
of advantage.
C. Property Rights and Reasonable Expectations
A final argument for the fairness of downzoning farmland is
predicated on the social dimension of property rights and landowner
expectations. To a certain extent, perceptions about the unfairness
of downzoning farmland are based on the view that property owners
have a right to do what they want with property, and that
downzoning forces landowners to forego opportunities that are
interwoven into their rights as owners of private property.
However, as noted by a number of scholars, such a perspective is
neither the traditional nor the proper way to view property rights.9 2
Rather, our legal system has long recognized that private property
interests are subject to broader public interests, in which property
ownership must be seen in a broader social setting with
responsibilities as well as rights.93 Thus, restricting property to
90. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 134-35.
91. See J. Dixon Essecks & Lela M. Long, The Political Viability of Agricultural Protection
Zoning to Prevent Premature Conversion of Farmland, in CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS,
PROTECTING FARMLAND AT THE FRINGE: Do REGULATIONS WORK? Sept. 5-7, 2001, at 80-83
(discussing studies documenting variety of problems that non-farm land uses posed to
farming, including trampling of crops, injury to livestock, vandalism of equipment and
property, theft, trash and litter, damaged tile and drainage ditches, crop losses due to storm
water runoff, traffic concerns, and potential nuisance suits).
92. See generally Myrl L. Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean
Soliloquy: A Role for Intellectual and Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVTL. L. 1095
(1996); Carol M. Rose, A Dozen Propositions on Private Property, Public Rights, and the New
Takings Legislation, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 265 (1996).
93. See John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings
Doctrine, 109 HARv. L. REV. 1252 (1996) (discussing numerous public limitations on private
property designated to further the public good); Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause:
Principles or Politics?, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 735, 751-52 (1985) (discussing restrictions on
perceived noxious activity in early America); Duncan, supra note 92, at 1133-37 (discussing
types of restrictions on property use found in early America).
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agricultural use does not necessarily involve the deprivation of
property rights, but rather asserts a limitation inherent in the
property itself.
This longstanding recognition that private property is subject to
public interests flows from the fact that property is a social
construct and society can legitimately define the extent of private
property interests to be limited by social concerns.94 Construing
property interests in this way recognizes that the consequences of
property use inevitably extend beyond land boundaries and will
often conflict with other social needs, necessitating a reasonable
accommodation of interests. This includes not only the avoidance of
nuisance-like activity, but also protection of sensitive lands,
including farmland, as a social resource. Although the need to
encourage investment in property requires substantial protection
of private property, which the law provides, it is reasonable to
assume that these private interests end when they interfere with
broader social interests.95 This is particularly true when the
restrictions are on future or potential uses, rather than established
uses.
Because private property is subject to such inherent limitations
to the public good, and because such restrictions are frequently
imposed on undeveloped land, downzoning of farmland to serve
such interests cannot usually be viewed as an unreasonable
interference with landowner expectations. This is particularly true
with regard to undeveloped property, such as farmland, which is
often subject to newly enacted regulations to promote the public
good. This relates to the idea of regulatory risk, the idea that
property ownership always involves the risk of regulation, and
therefore, any investment should take into account the possibility
of regulation.9" The Supreme Court has developed this idea in
several cases, stating that the risk of regulation is part of economic
94. Scholars have often noted that property is a social creation of the state. See, e.g.,
Daniel W. Bromley, Regulatory Takings: Coherent Concept or Logical Contradiction?, 17 VT.
L. REV. 647, 653- 55 (1993); Coletta, supra note 67, at 361-63; John A. Humbach, Law and
a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339, 344-45 (1989).
95. The Supreme Court has frequently recognized this principle, stating that property
ownership is limited by public needs. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410
(1915) (stating that private property interests must at times "yield to the good of the
community" for the sake of "progress"); Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349,
355 (1908) (stating that private property limited by other public interests, including exercise
of the police power "to protect the atmosphere, the water and the forests"); Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U.S. 623, 665 (1887) (stating that "all property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community.").
96. See, e.g., Humbach, supra note 94, at 367-68; Daniel Mandelker, Investment-Backed
Expectations in Taking Law, 27 URB. LAw. 215, 233-36 (1995); Frank I. Michelman, A
Skeptical View of "Property Rights" Legislation, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409, 415 (1995).
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life, which includes the possibility of economic loss.97 Thus, since
reasonable expectations necessarily incorporate the possibility of
land use restrictions, especially on undeveloped land, expectations
are not unfairly interfered with when such restrictions are imposed.
Not surprisingly, Professor Richardson found the idea of
regulatory risk and landowner expectations mitigating fairness
concerns unpersuasive. First, he said that "reasonableness" must
be based on available data, and the data available to owners of
farmland shows a proliferation of suburban subdivisions,
suggesting that farmers can also reasonably expect to develop.9"
Second, any concept of reasonableness should be incorporated into
market prices, which typically reflect development potential, which
"proponents of downzoning ... fail to recognize ... as an objective
measure of reasonable expectations."99 Third, he argued that the
Supreme Court has endorsed a concept of "temporal equity" that
"means that if your neighbors were allowed to develop their
property in the past, it is unfair that you be denied that
opportunity."' °  Finally, he argued that the regulatory risk
argument presented perverse incentives for owners of farmland to
prematurely develop property.101
The first two criticisms above, which have some merit, are
partly answered by simply distinguishing between the "likelihood"
and the "possibility" of future restrictions. The concept of regulatory
risk is not based on the likelihood of future regulations; rather, it
need only be based on the possibility of future restrictions. It is true
that the available "data" might often suggest that land can likely be
developed. However, the possibility of future restrictions exists as
long as the property is undeveloped. Therefore, a landowner's
expectations needs to incorporate that possibility, even if it is not
a probability. This is particularly true in our legal system, which
has long provided far greater protection to established uses than
potential uses.10 2 Further, the land use field is heavily regulated,
and subject to frequent changes, thus providing some degree of
97. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992); Connolly v. Pension
Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211,227 (1986) (explaining that "[t]hose who do business in the
regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent
amendments to achieve the legislative end.") (quoting FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S.
84, 91 (1958)). See also Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16 (1976) (stating
that "our cases are clear that legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful
solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations"); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A.
Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30 (1984).




102. See MANDELKER, supra note 56, §§ 6.12-6.23.
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reasonable expectation of possible, though not necessarily likely,
change.1 °3
For similar reasons, current market prices should discount
future market prices by the possibility of regulation. Thus, if
property is worth $10,000 an acre if it can be developed, but only
$5,000 an acre if zoned farmland, and there is a twenty percent
chance that the property will be downzoned to farmland, the
market should discount the $5,000 per acre difference by the twenty
percent probability it will occur. That would result in a $1,000 per
acre discount and thus a $9,000 per acre value. Admittedly,
however, possibilities of future regulation are hard to determine,
and thus, markets might inappropriately ignore them.
Nevertheless, a rational market participant should discount for
regulatory risk, and, indeed, it probably happens to some degree. As
illustrated by this example, high value farmland on the suburban
fringe, if zoned for development, does not necessarily signal that
some discounting has not occurred.
Professor Richardson's third criticism of reasonable landowner
expectations, concerning "temporal equity," has less merit, and,
indeed, is just plain wrong. Lucas cannot be fairly read for the
principle that "if your neighbors were allowed to develop their
property in the past, it is unfair that you be denied that
opportunity."1 °4 The finding of a taking in Lucas was based on the
loss of all economic viability and the trial court's finding that the
property was left with absolutely no value. °5
The problem with the "temporal equity" argument, depending
on how it is defined, is that it would lock land uses into the past,
making it very difficult for local communities, as well as society in
general, to respond to changing social conditions. As noted by Carol
Rose, however, the nature of public interests that private property
103. The dynamic, as opposed to static, nature of land use regulations, in which regulatory
changes frequently occur, has been noted by numerous commentators. See, e.g., ROBERT C.
ELLIcKSON & VIci L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 104-05 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the
"dynamic" nature of zoning as practiced today, in which zoning map restrictions are
essentially "first offers"); JULIAN C. JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE
PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT REGULATION LAw 152 (2003) (noting "that the name of the
zoning game is change.").
104. Richardson, supra note 2, at 87.
105. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015-20, 1030 (1992). Nowhere does
the Court in its analysis suggest that being deprived a right others had in the past is
relevant in the basic takings inquiry. The Court does suggest that once a loss of all economic
viability is established, an extremely rare occurrence, then "[tihe fact that a particular use
has long been engaged in by similarly situated owners" suggests that the restriction does not
fall within the nuisance exception to the loss of all economic viability as a categorical taking.
Id. at 1031. But, that fact does not become relevant until the landowner challenging the
restriction first establishes the loss of all economic viability.
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is subject to necessarily evolves over time." 6 What constitutes the
broader public interest is not static, and neither should be
restrictions on land to pursue those interests. This admittedly
might interfere with expectations in the short term, but at a more
general level, there is the expectation that since public needs might
change over time, so must restrictions. Otherwise, there is a
temporal domino effect, where new restrictions can never be
imposed because someone was allowed to develop in the past.
Indeed, in the seminal zoning case of Village of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co.,' °7 the Supreme Court recognized the principle that
restrictions which might have been unconstitutional in one period
will be constitutional at a later date because of changing societal
needs.0'0 This principle has been borne out repeatedly over the
years, as courts have recognized the validity of new forms of land
use controls that substantially interfered with pre-existing
development opportunities.' 9
Professor Richardson's final point, that the regulatory risk
argument creates perverse incentives for owners of farmland to
prematurely develop their property, makes some sense. As stated
by Richardson, "[i]f a landowner assumes that regulations will
become more restrictive, then the landowner holds an incentive to
develop his property immediately before the rules change. Given
this incentive, land will be prematurely developed and the aim of
farmland protection frustrated."'"10
106. See Rose, supra note 92, at 274-84.
107. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
108. The Supreme Court stated:
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the
great increase and concentration of population, problems have developed,
and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue to
require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of
private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, necessity
and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent
that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even half a
century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and
oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex
conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic
regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit
street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and
unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the
meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their
application must expand or contract to meet the new and different
conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their
operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be
otherwise.
Id. at 386-87.
109. Id. One obvious example is zoning itself, which was necessitated by the problems
attendant to increasingly urbanization. Another example is wetland regulation.
110. Richardson, supra note 2, at 87.
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I concede this is a potential problem. It is tempered, however,
by several considerations. First, development itself requires the
right set of market conditions, and as a practical matter,
landowners cannot simply decide to develop their property. Thus,
the threat of premature development will often fail to materialize,
if for no other reason than that there is not yet a market. This is
true even if the market value of the land is substantially higher if
it can be developed, since markets often anticipate future
opportunities and speculate. In fact, the law as currently developed
certainly presents landowners with the threat of regulatory risk,
whether expressing it as such or not, and communities have still
been able to identify farmland for preservation. This indicates that
the threat of regulatory risk, which is a very real one in our society,
has not precipitated a premature rush to development.
Second, the problem of perverse incentives can in part be
addressed by strategic use of PDRs and TDRs, when available.
Although I do not believe that such compensatory programs are
necessary for agricultural zoning to be fair, I support their use in
appropriate situations. By targeting PDR and TDR use to
properties that are likely to face substantial development pressure
in the near future, but not using them for farmland more distant
from development, a limited use of PDRs and TDRs can address the
perverse incentive problem, to the extent it might exist. This will be
examined more in the next section.
IV. A BRIEF COMMENT ON PLANNING, PDRS, AND EFFECTIVE
FARMLAND PRESERVATION
Contrary to the impression created by Professor Richardson, I
am not opposed to compensatory farmland preservation programs
such as PDRs and TDRs. To the contrary, I have stated on several
occasions that to be effective, farmland preservation must involve
a comprehensive approach incorporating right-to-farm laws,
differential taxation provisions, compensatory programs to the
extent feasible, and agricultural zoning."1 I do not believe, however,
that the use of agricultural zoning should be dependent on
accompanying compensatory programs in all instances. This is
certainly not constitutionally required, and I do not believe it is
mandated by fairness concerns.
I also do not believe that farmland preservation should be
pursued at all costs, oblivious to other societal needs. The need to
preserve farmland must be considered in the context of other public
needs, most notably affordable housing and land for economic
111. See Cordes, supra note 3, at 1082-84; Agricultural Zoning, supra note 45, at 453-55.
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development. 112 In theory, the market itself would arguably reflect
societal preferences and needs through pricing mechanisms.
Markets are imperfect, however, and fail to incorporate a number
of external costs, a problem that is particularly true with regard to
farmland. 3 Yet it is important to emphasize that farmland
preservation itself must be viewed in a broader context, and it is
undoubtedly in society's best interest that some farmland be
converted to residential and other uses.
To the extent economically feasible, PDRs, and if possible,
TDRs, should be used for two reasons. First, they admittedly
address the perceived unfairness of substantial drops in property
value and make preservation more politically acceptable. Second,
they also are more likely to be effective in permanently restricting
land to agricultural use rather than agricultural zoning. Zoning, as
practiced today, tends to be a very dynamic system, in which
upzoning changes are granted with ease, especially when subject to
political or development pressure. For this reason, zoning is often
viewed as an unstable control mechanism, especially when applied
to undeveloped land subject to substantial development pressure." 4
In contrast, restrictions pursuant to PDR and TDR programs are
112. See Agricultural Zoning, supra note 45, at 442-44. Farmland preservation, if not done
correctly, is potentially in tension with efforts to provide affordable housing. This is because
agricultural zoning might potentially raise the cost of new entry level development by
limiting the supply of available land for new construction. All else being equal, when the
supply of a commodity decreases, and demand remains the same, the price increases.
Opponents of growth control measures have argued that such control will raise housing
prices. See Clint Bolick, Subverting the American Dream: Government Dictated "Smart
Growth" is Unwise and Unconstitutional, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (2000); Paul J. Boudreaux,
Looking the Ogre in the Eye: Ten Tough Questions for the Antisprawl Movement, 14 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 171, 188-89 (2000). See also ELLICKSON & BEEN, supra note 103, at 996 (noting
that most empirical studies conclude that growth controls raise housing prices). Other
scholars, however, have suggested that efforts to combat sprawl need not increase housing
costs, and indeed, sprawl itself has a negative impact on affordable housing. See Robert H.
Freilich & Bruce G. Beshoff, The Social Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183, 191 (1997).
As a practical matter, it would appear that the actual impact of agricultural zoning on
the cost of new entry housing in part depends on whether there are concomitant plans for
compact growth. To the extent government decreases the supply of land through agricultural
zoning, but fails to pursue compact growth alternatives, the cost of new housing might
increase. On the other hand, if effective efforts at compact growth accompany agricultural
zoning, as advocates of smart growth suggest, the overall effect might well be to decrease
housing costs. This is because compact growth reduces the percentage of housing cost
attributable to new land and also reduces infrastructure costs.
113. The social costs of suburban sprawl, of which conversion of farmland is an integral
part, have been well documented. See, e.g., Henry R. Richmond, From Sea to Shining Sea:
Manifest Destiny and the National Land Use Dilemma, 13 PACE L. REV. 327, 335-36 (1993);
William W. Buzbee, Urban Sprawl, Federalism, and the Problem of Institutional Complexity,
68 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 69-77 (1999); Robert H. Freilich & Bruce G. Peshoff, The Social
Costs of Sprawl, 29 URB. LAW. 183 (1997).
114. See MALONE, supra note 4, § 6:48; White, supra note 46, at 118-19.
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often more insulated from pressure, in part because compensation
has been provided to the affected landowner.
For this reason, and to the extent feasible, PDRs should be used
in conjunction with agricultural zoning, a point I have emphasized
in several previous articles.' 5 Assuming that the finances for PDRs
are limited, they need to be used in a strategic fashion, balancing
several competing concerns. On the one hand, they arguably should
not be used too closely to rapidly growing areas with substantial
development pressure, where development might be inevitable and
possibly needed at some point. Conversely, use of PDRs too far out
is a poor use of limited funds. Such land can be zoned agricultural
without compensation, since the economic impact is likely to be
more minimal. Instead, it makes most sense to use PDRs where a
growth line should be formed, creating a buffer zone between more
intensive uses and other farmland subject to just agricultural
zoning. 116
This potentially serves three purposes. First, it insulates the
property most subject to development pressure from conversion,
decreasing conversion pressure on agriculturally zoned land.
Second, it targets use of PDRs to those landowners who face
substantial economic loss by agricultural zoning, but whose
property might still be realistically preserved as farmland. Third,
the use of PDRs to create buffers helps the perception of farming
stability, encouraging investment in farms." 7
Communities might also consider use of TDRs as a compliment
to agricultural zoning, which provide some compensation to affected
landowners without the fiscal limitations of PDRs. For this reason,
they have been successfully used as a compliment to agricultural
zoning in a few instances, most notably Montgomery County in
Maryland and the Pinelands in New Jersey.'18 In both cases, use of
TDRs have provided a compensatory basis for zoning, helping to
ensure its acceptability in the farming community, while also
helping to provide for increased development density within
designated growth areas. As noted earlier, however, to be
successful, TDRs require the right mix of development conditions
115. See Cordes, supra note 3, at 1082-84; Agricultural Zoning, supra note 45, at 453-55.
116. See Agricultural Zoning, supra note 45, at 454.
117. Id. Commentators have noted that the encroaching development problem undermines
farming stability and viability because of increasing interferences with non-farm uses and
the elimination of a critical mass to sustain a farm economy. Remaining farms thus become
even more susceptible to conversion, even for those who desire to remain in farming. See
Edward Thompson, Jr., "Hybrid" Farmland Protection Programs: A New Paradigm for
Growth Management?, 23 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 831, 839-40 (1999).
118. See DANIES& BOwERS,supra note 3, at 179-86 (describing six different TDR programs
designed to preserve farmland).
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suitable to absorb transferred development, as well as stability of
zoning controls within those areas, a relatively rare occurrence." 9
For that reason, few successful TDR programs have emerged,
despite their significant popularity in academic literature.
Above everything else, farmland preservation, including
agricultural zoning and compensatory programs, needs to be done
pursuant to sound planning. This includes identifying farmland
that perhaps should be considered for development at some future
date in order to meet growth needs. At the same time, farmland
targeted for preservation should be identified as early as possible
to minimize the economic impact on affected landowners. Such
early planning should substantially mitigate perceptions of
unfairness, since most agriculturally zoned property will not yet
reflect substantially higher value based on possible development.
V. CONCLUSION
There is little reason to believe that the debate surrounding the
validity and fairness of farmland preservation and other
environmental land use controls will abate any time soon. The
"smart growth" planning movement is picking up steam and often
includes farmland preservation as a central component. 120 At the
same time, suburbs continue to expand, placing increased pressure
on some of America's prime farmland."' Central to the discussion
of fairness of farmland preservation methods is the nature of
private property rights, and to what extent they should yield to the
broader public interest.
American law does and should provide substantial protection to
private property rights, while still recognizing broader public
interests. The balance the law has drawn, and one implicit in the
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence, is that private rights in
land are given substantial protection once actual development
expenditures have occurred, absent nuisance-like activity. In such
instances, there are strong policy reasons to protect expenditures,
which are critical to societal well-being. In particular, unless
owners and land developers have reasonable expectations of
continued ownership and productive use, there is little reason to
build housing and other land uses essential to society.
Conversely, the law leans more heavily in favor of public
interests when regulating potential or future uses of property,
119. See Kayden, supra note 48, at 578 and accompanying text.
120. See generally Briffault, supra note 10; Pollard, supra note 10.
121. See SORENSEN, supra note 3, at 8-20 (documenting increasing development pressure
on some of America's prime farmland).
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including restrictions on undeveloped land. Even here the law
continues to provide some protection to private property interests,
but to a much more limited degree. This is reflected in the Court's
two-part Lucas/Penn Central test for regulatory takings, which
permits government entities to place substantial restrictions on
undeveloped land, often resulting in substantial diminution in
value, without a taking being found. As applied to farmland, this
current takings analysis should rarely result in a taking, a fact
borne out by a number of lower court decisions.
To the extent possible, PDRs and TDRs should be considered as
means to mitigate the economic impact of restrictions, but this is
often unrealistic. The question then remains whether imposing
agricultural zoning on farmland, absent compensation, is inherently
unfair, and it is here that Professor Richardson and I disagree. He
emphasized the individual status of the landowner in relation to the
single restriction in question. In his world, landowners can
frequently be regulatory winners, but not losers. Receiving from the
government is expected, but not giving back. Further, individual
property rights appear to take preeminence over broader social
needs.
In contrast, I and many others see matters through a broader
regulatory and social context. High land values near advancing
development reflect not only private investment, but also
substantial government expenditures, mitigating the perceived
unfairness of restrictions that diminish those values. The fairness
of a regulation must not only be evaluated by itself, in which some
losers are almost inevitable, but also from a broader perspective in
which other regulations benefit the same person. Most importantly,
individual rights in potential or future land use are held in balance
with broader social needs, a balance that has long been recognized
in our legal system. This perspective is the one that most clearly
corresponds with takings jurisprudence. I believe it is also one that
corresponds with basic notions of fairness.
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